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Abstract:
This paper quantitatively explores high‐level links between power sector
reforms and wider institutional reforms in the economy for a set of 27
diverse countries in rapid political and economic transition since 1990.
Panel‐data econometrics based on bias corrected dynamic fixed effect
analysis (LSDVC) is performed to assess the impact of reforms on
macroeconomic and power sector outcomes. The results indicate that
power sector reform is indeed a more complicated process than initially
perceived. The results also show that power sector reform is greatly
inter‐dependent with reforms in other sectors in the economy. We
conclude that the success of power sector reforms on outcomes in
developing countries will largely depend on the extent in which
countries are able to synchronize inter‐sector reforms in the economy.
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1. Introduction
The early 1990s brought about fundamental changes in economic and political
settings among the popularly termed ‘transition economies’ (TECs hereafter)
comprising twenty‐nine countries1 of Central and Eastern Europe and the Former
Soviet Union (FSU). The end of central planning paved the way towards
implementing economy wide market‐oriented reforms in the TECs as a part of
pervasive political and economic changes. The pace and order of economy‐wide
reforms markedly varied across the TECs primarily reflecting the constraints on any
government’s ability and resources. Some countries such as Lithuania, Russia and
Slovak Republic opted for instant large scale privatisation without appropriate legal
framework as a ‘shock therapy’ which often resulted in significant economic and
social costs. Elsewhere, civil wars and ethnic conflicts in Macedonia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and Tajikistan disrupted and delayed the gradual progress in the
transiton process in these countries. While the incentive to join the European Union
and benefit from regional integration provided impetus to sectoral reforms in
countries across Central and Eastern Europe in the early 2000s; the isolated Asian
economies in the CIS region are still reeling under the legacy of central planning with
low political commitment to sectoral reform since independence.
The systemic change of early 1990’s coincided with rising popularity of power sector
reforms around the world. Furthermore, the power sector was also the unanimous
choice (or target) across the TECs to rapidly undergo the scissors of marketization for
two major reasons: a) the economy as a whole was highly subsidized through
unusually low power prices prior collapse and b) the direct and indirect contribution
of the power sector towards the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP)2, the
national strategic aspects of supply security coupled with mass politicisation and
natural monopoly characteristics of the sector meant that the role of the power
sector was crucial in determining the fate of economic reforms (in terms of speed
1
The countries included can be divided into three distinct groups: Central Eastern Europe and Baltic
States (CEB) comprising Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic and
Slovenia; South-Eastern Europe (SEE) comprising Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, FYR
Macedonia ,Serbia, Romania and Montenegro; Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) comprising
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Besides these countries, Turkey and Mongolia are also
included in the group of transition economies as per European Bank of Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD) areas of operation.
2
For instance, the oil and gas exports for Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan constituted 68.7% and 30.7%
of GDP respectively in 2000. See Table A in Appendix I.
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and order) for countries experiencing drastic systemic changes. Thus, the role of
power sector can be perceived to be pivotal in economic growth policies of the TECs.
Two decades have passed by since the mass‐experiment of market‐based reforms
swept across the power sectors of TECs. Yet, the current status of power sector
reform in these countries is described as being one of mixed outcomes, stalled
reforms and uncertainty (Williams and Ghanadan, 2006). Partly, the present state of
the power sector across TECs is reminiscent of the fact that the collapse of central
planning was not a choice of any country or government but rather a consequence of
dysfunctional political and economic system of yesteryears. Belarus and the Caspian
countries (e.g. Turkmenistan) have exhibited the greatest reluctancy towards power
sector reform as these countries have not even started with the initial reform
process of liberalization, small scale privatization and the creation of an environment
supportive of private investment. Largely, it also reflects the failure of sure‐fire
recipes of western advisors to cater to the local taste in the process of quick
transition to a market economy (Stiglitz, 1999). Several new European Union (EU)
member states like Hungary and Bulgaria though nearing the advanced phase of
power sector reforms still experience chronic power shortages, high distribution
losses, lack of investments and vulnerability of energy supply. Thus, it is debatable
whether the reforming countries have significantly benefited from power sector
reforms than the non‐reforming ones. Likewise, it is also worth pondering is if the
energy‐rich countries like Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Russia, Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan benefited from power sector reforms since 1990 relative to non‐energy‐
rich transition economies with a gradual real increase in energy prices since reforms.
It is tacitly agreed among policymakers that the power sector reforms in the
transition economies has proven to be difficult and complicated on‐going process
(Jamasb et al. 2004). The current sectoral performance portrays that formulated
policies did not effectively understand the functioning of a market economy coupled
with the misunderstandings of the reform process itself that largely failed to take
country‐specific conditions into account. Hence, the empirical evidence of electricity
market reforms has starkly defied the logic of reforms. The success of market‐
oriented electricity reforms can tremendously depend on the development of
market‐based institutional framework to support reforms (Hogan, 2001). So, similar
approaches to power sector reform have led to utterly different outcomes in TECs
depending upon the formal and informal institutions existing in each country
(Hirschhausen and Wadel, 2001). The experience with following a standard menu of
reform based on OECD experiences (primarily the UK and Norway3) has backfired as
electricity reform in the TECs is different from OECD reform in terms of reform
3

Chile is the only non-OECD country that experienced a successful electricity reform process since the
start of the reform in the early 1980s and is considered to be a pioneer in power sector reform.
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drivers, sectoral aspects and institutional context. Policymakers for a large period
failed to understand that electricity reform in the TECs is not an undertaking
confined to the sector but closely interlinked with problematic legal and institutional
contexts throughout the economy (Williams and Ghanadan, 2006).
This paper aims to qualitatively and quantitatively assess the often poorly explored
link between power sector reforms and wider institutional reforms in the economy
across different groups of the transition countries. We study the link via the impact
of power sector reforms on the economic, technical and environmental aspects of
power sector also accounting for the interactions between power sector reforms and
economy‐wide sectoral level institutions since 1990. By doing so, the paper attempts
to examine the role of country‐level institutional structure and framework in
explaining why some power markets work and some do not based on the ‘New
Institutional Economics (NIE)4’. The contributions of this paper are two‐fold. Firstly,
the lessons learnt from two decades of massive irreversible reform experiment can
provide valuable insights to the power sector reforms of other developing and less
developed countries in Asia and Africa where ‘economic transition’ is on‐going.
Secondly, this paper contributes to the relatively scarce literature on the quantitative
analysis of power sector reform across the TECs using panel‐data econometrics.
The paper is planned as follows. Section 2 of the paper continues to assess the
literatures encompassing the relationship among different sectoral level institutions
in the economy and power sector reforms. Section 3 explains the drivers of power
sector reform in TECs along with a background of the power sector prior and after
reforms. In section 4, the data and relevant econometric methodology is discussed.
Section 5 presents, discusses and summarizes the results while section 6 concludes
with relevant policy recommendations.
2. The relationship between country level institutions and power sector reforms
Although the neoclassical economic theory considers both competition and
privatization as the core aspects of a market economy; the outcomes cannot be
guaranteed to be Pareto efficient in the absence of proper institutional
infrastructure (Rodrik et al. 2004). North (1971) has criticized the standard
neoclassical theory as it rejects the role of institutions and time. The early phase of
the systemic change rested on the notion that market‐oriented policies would
automatically install the institutions of a market‐based economy during the
4

The term ‘NIE’ was first coined by Williamson (1975). As per North (1971) who is considered as one
of the founding fathers of institutional economics, NIE has two major strands: a) institutional
environment (so called rules of the game which can be explicit, formal or implicit, informal) and b)
institutional arrangements by contrast are specific guidelines-the so called ‘governance structures’
(Williamson, 1996).
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transition process. This led to a decade long of neglecting institutional difference
across countries in implementing power sector reforms (Hirschhausen and Waelde,
2006). Stiglitz (1999) argues that the enforcement mechanisms of reforms (including
power sector reforms) were weak as the state’s legal and judicial capacities were
limited during the transition process brewing inefficient rent seeking and corruption
with shock therapy reforms (such as large scale privatization). Empirical econometric
studies by Heybey and Murrell (1997) have concluded that the success of sectoral
reforms on outcomes in any transition economy depends much more on the overall
institutional framework than on short‐term policies. Bacon and Besant‐Jones (2001)
found evidence of country policy and institutions being positively correlated with
reform while country risk being negatively related with reform. Rufin and Rangan
(2004) using institutional explanatory variables with electricity reform scores found
an ambiguous and insignificant relationship between judicial independence and
competition.
The role of broad and sectoral level institutions as a key element to properly
understand a market‐based economy was also overlooked in TECs. Arrow (1972),
Hirschmann (1992), Putnam (1993), Fukuyama (1995), Stiglitz (1999) and others have
argued that the success of market‐oriented economy cannot be understood in terms
of narrow economic incentives such as prices but norms, institutions, social capital
and trust play critical roles. Pollitt (2009) in relation to the South Eastern Europe
(SEE) electricity markets concludes that power reform is a part of wider institutional
reforms and successful electricity reforms cannot be achieved unless there is
sufficient economy‐wide institutional reform to reinforce power sector reforms.
Based on Levy and Spiller (1996), Kennedy (2003) also underscores the importance
of having a proper institutional context for regulation (for example whether or not a
regulator is politically independent5) for power sectors reforms to produce its
desired consequences.
Following Easterly and Levine (2003), two relevant views are drawn and hence
studied in this paper on the relationship between overall institutional development
and power sector reforms. The first view holds that electricity sector reform’s major
effect on electricity sector performance works through long‐lasting institutions.
Economies where reforms are most effectively implemented are able to do so by
adapting to the required political and legal changes through suitable institutional
development6. The second view maintains that power sector reforms and
5

The criteria vary when assessing whether a regulator can be considered independent or not. The
widely used criteria are the nature and terms of regulatory appointment, source of funding of the
regulatory body and the extent of participation of the regulators in designing regulatory content such as
tariff methodology. Please see Stern (1997), (1998) for a detailed discussion.
6
This means that the role of technology is endogenous to the institutions as the necessary arrangement
for the adoption of better technology works through reforms necessitated.
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institutions should reflect current know‐how and political conditions of the power
sector. This means that any changes in knowledge on reforms and institutions
suitable for improved performance of the power sector or changes in political
objectives should translate to quicker changes in institutions and reforms7.
3. Motives and Contexts of Power Sector Reform in TECs
Though reform was inevitable and much needed in the power sector of TECs; factors
external to the power sector played a major role to catalyse the electricity sector
reform process. For example, Hungary pursued power sector reform in order to
reduce the fiscal deficit while for Czech Republic and Russia; reforming power sector
was vastly a part of overall ownership change. The most important factor was the
limited state finance and unsustainable burdens on state budgets to finance the
sector with short‐run excess capacity (Williams and Ghanadan, 2006; Bacon and
Besant Jones, 2001, Joskow 1998). While economic efficiency, competition and
choice were the main drivers of electricity deregulation reform in the developed
economies (such as OECD); these aspects were secondary to drive electricity reform
process in the TECs8. The oil shocks of the 1970s led to soaring foreign debt, huge
budget deficits and high inflation forcing the government of the state‐led model in
the TECs to implement economy wide structural adjustment programs in mitigating
the macroeconomic and fiscal crisis. The power sector including other state‐led
utilities was favoured candidate to undergo restructuring as these sectors had the
greatest potential for revenue generation through corporatization and privatization.
Hence, power sector reforms for cost recovery and private investment followed suit
as an alternative source to finance the sector and raise government revenue (Jhirad,
1990).
International financial institutions such as the World Bank, the Asian Development
Bank (ADB), EBRD, and the Inter‐American Development Bank (IADB) also played a
role to initiate power sector reforms as the economic stabilization loans came with
strings attached to reform the power sector in the TECs (Bacon and Besant‐Jones,
2001). Furthermore, as of early 2000 the prospect of EU accession has had a
significant influence on the extent of power sector reforms in many CEB and SEE
countries in the region (EBRD, 2001). Following Jamasb et al. (2004), the motives
behind power sector reforms in the TECs is summarised in table 1 in terms of ‘push’
and ‘pull’ factors.
7

The second view is in line with North (1994) which includes the role of time in understanding the
operation of markets.
8
A number of studies have been carried out to assess the impacts of reform concerning developed
countries. Please see for example Steiner (2001), Hattori and Tsutui (2004) to study the empirical
evidence of power sector reforms on performance for OECD countries.
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Push Factors
Macroeconomic events: 1970 oil crisis,
Post‐Soviet economy‐wide market‐based
transition (1989), Asian Financial crisis
(1997‐1998), economy‐wide
liberalization and reform programs as
initiated by the fiscal crisis
Limited national fiscal ability: high public
debt, utility borrowing as a major
proportion of national debt

OECD Deregulation: new energy
multinationals created as a result of
OECD energy sector deregulation,
provided investment opportunities for
Europe and USA
Investments constraints of the power
sector: no ability to self‐finance, system
upgrading and modernization required,
high projected electricity demand

Pull Factors
Capital raising options: privatization of
state assets, Greenfield private
investment

Lending for institutional reform:
macroeconomic stabilization lending
conditional upon power sector
restructuring, asset privatization (IMF),
liberalisation and reform for new power
sector loans (World Bank in 1993)
Spill‐over effects from international
experiences: learning from pioneering
reforms of power sectors in Chile,
England and Wales and Norway in the
1980s and early 1990s
EU accession: opportunities to benefit
from regional integration by reforming
the power sector in accordance to the EU
Directives

Table 1: Drivers of power sector reforms in TECs
Source: Own Compilation

The early phase of reform policies were predominantly based on the theoretical
analysis and policy recommendations of economic advisors influenced by electricity
sector deregulation experiences in Europe and USA. A typical standard menu of
reform for the TECs and non‐OECD countries was prescribed by the World Bank
through the reform ‘scorecard’ (World Bank, 1999). The major elements of the menu
followed a gradual progression from forming energy laws to sector corporatization
and commercialization with an independent energy regulator in place that
eventually led to sector restructuring and privatization (see Jamasb, 2004). The
creation of competitive wholesale markets was the last step to fully complete the
reform process as outlined in the scorecard. While the creation of a spot market or
pool was one of the most innovative reforms of privatization in the power sector of
the TECs; it needs to be examined whether it led to cost‐reflective bidding
(Newberry, 1994).
7

However, the ‘scorecard’ as well as earlier power sector reform programmes is
criticized on the grounds that the local contexts were thoroughly ignored and not
reflected (Bacon and Besant‐Jones, 2001). The focus of the standard menu of
reforms was primarily financial with societal concerns such as access, service quality,
socially efficient pricing and environment being ignored (Williams and Ghanadan,
2006)9. Fyodor Dostoevsky, the famous Russian novelist in his book ‘The Brothers
Karamazov’, wrote ‘There you have it‐reforms on unprepared ground, and copied
from foreign institutions as well‐nothing but harm’. His insight to a large extent can
be applicable to the power sector reforms10 in TECs and is a matter of empirical
investigation under section 5 of this paper. Meanwhile, the subsection below
highlights the economic, technical and environmental aspect of power sector status
before and in the early process of transition process.
3.1 Power sector status before and in the early stages of reform
The power sector of economies in transition in the Former Soviet Union and Central
and Eastern Europe at the beginning of the reform period had some common
characteristics in terms of the economic, technical and environmental aspects of
power generation. They are described as below:
a) Declining national GDP: As already mentioned, bailing out the economy with
sinking GDP as an aftermath of the oil crisis of 1979 and 1980s was one of the
objectives of the economic reforms in TECs. Reforming the power sector thus was
considered appropriate by the transition countries as a major way to recover from
the fiscal crisis. The contractions in real GDP during the early reform phase in
Central Europe were comparable to the 20% fall in the US during the Great
Depression while for other CEE and CIS economies the fall was even higher (Stern
and Davis, 1997). Though the causality is not clear, the fall in GDP can be attributed
to a major fall in energy consumption significantly lowering the industrial output and
vice‐versa. Table B in appendix I shows the annual percent change in regional GDP
(1990 as the base year) and energy consumption from 1990 to 1994. It is apparent
from table B that that energy consumption declined at a similar fashion to the
decline in GDP by around 18% in 1990‐1993. Elsewhere for Russia and FSU, the
decline in GDP was more severe than the drop in energy demand.
Figure 1 below traces the per capita GDP path of the CEB, SEE and CIS countries from
1990‐2008. All country groups experienced a recovery after the Asian financial crisis
9

Esatche et al. (2002) have also addressed these issues in the Latin American context as a part of wider
institutional reform context.
10
Pittman (2003) uses Dostoevsky’s witticism to analyse the speed and success of reforms of the
infrastructure sectors in transition economies.
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although the CEB region had experienced the greatest slump. The reason could be
because the CEB region includes 7 out of 9 countries in the EU with a strong
industrial base that was hard‐hit by declining energy consumption. All countries
experienced a significant fall in per capita GDP during the early phase of transition.

Figure 1: Per capita GDP across the TECs from1990‐2008 in US dollars (constant 2000)
Source: Own compilation

Given an established relationship between GDP and energy consumption; the power
sector reforms in the TCECs should have significantly affected the per capita national
GDP over‐time.
Hypothesis 1: Power sector reforms and wider economic institutional reforms in the
economy bear significant results in the overall national GDP among the TECs.
b) Short‐run excess capacity: Although the region had ample capacity; the breakup of
the Soviet Union also broke the integrated energy supply system allowing the oil and
gas prices to rise as par to the international levels. The hike in energy prices
produced an energy price shocks in the oil importing countries. Energy supply from
other FSU producers such as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan also experienced
frequent disruptions with the Russian monopoly over export routes through Ukraine,
Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. Hence, due to security of supply concerns and to
avoid the harsh rise in oil prices; countries might have been tempted to add
additional generation capacity through meaningful power sector reforms in the lurch
towards reducing energy dependency.
As of 1989, numerous nuclear reactors in Armenia, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Russia,
Slovakia and Ukraine had an installed capacity of 300 gigawatts (Gray, 1995). With
time, several unsafe nuclear plants were shut down (for e.g Chernobyl in Ukraine in

9

2001). With demand for electricity rising in particular and supply security being
increasingly threatened, the early experience of excess capacity is thought to be over
by now (EBRD, 2008). Figure 2 below shows the gross generating installed capacity in
the CIS region has been increasing post 2000 while the figures are fairly stable in the
SEE since 1991.

Figure 2: Gross generating installed capacity from1991‐2008 ( million Kilowatts)
Source: Own compilation

Hypothesis 2: Power sector reforms and economy‐wide institutional reforms can
enhance overall capacity in generation in the TECs and improve the supply security.
Similarly, it is likely that increasing environmental obligations11 and incentives over
the years have prompted the transition countries to expand their renewable energy
base. The phasing out of the unsafe nuclear plants and motives to reduce the
emissions from the use of dirty coal could have induced investments in renewable
generation capacity in the transition regions. The transition towards a less carbon
intensive economy combined with the need to meet the increasing electricity
demand should have prompted countries to invest more in renewable capacity
expansion. Figure 3 shows that thermal generation dominated the nuclear and
renewable generation capacity across the transition countries in 2007.

11
This might especially be the case for those countries that joined or are in the process of joining EU to
match the environmental standards as expected by the EU.
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Figure 3: Capacity mix in 2007 across TECs
Source: Own compilation

Hypothesis 2.1: Power sector reforms and economy‐wide institutional reforms can
enhance overall renewable capacity in generation across the TECs over‐time.
c) Low and distorted electricity prices and high power losses: Before reforms started
in 1990, energy prices in the transition economies were majorly de‐aligned from
economic cost with tax revenue being used to subsidize various consumption groups
including households. The price structure was also distorted as low household prices
were achieved by charging relatively higher prices for industrial users (so called
cross‐subsidisation). But, the practice of lower prices of electricity and to households
in particular seems to have been maintained during the transition period as
illustrated by table D in appendix I.

Figure 4: Transmission and Distribution losses across TECs (in % of total output)
Own compilation
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The experience of few TECs from Table D suggests that the practice of low electricity
prices and price distortion through cross‐subsidies is largely prevailing in the CIS
countries with twin problems of low bill collection and high commercial losses12. The
low power prices has been a major setback in terms self‐supporting the system by
generating investment for capacity and grid expansion/maintenance culminating to
high levels of transmission and distribution losses.
Hypothesis 3: Power sector reforms and institutional reforms in the economy are
thus expected to have increased the electricity prices over time and hence minimised
cross subsidies, commercial and non‐commercial (technical) losses while maximizing
bill collection across these countries.
However, the lack of sufficient data on prices and commercials losses has confined
the above hypothesis to be tested only in terms of the technical losses. Figure 4
reports the technical losses as a percentage of total power output across the TECs.
The losses remain the lowest on average in the CEB region and the highest in the SEE
region. For example, Albania belonging to the SEE region had the losses reaching
69% of output produced in 2006. The high level of losses could indicate the poor
state of the transmission and distribution networks in need of maiantence and
upgrading and hence a major technological constraint. On the other hand, the high
technical losses also demonstrate the lack of investments in the network
infrastructures to upgrade and maintain them. The lower power prices also imply
that the power sectors across TECs is unable to raise the required capital and thus
making them incapable of supporting the system.
d) Changing Patterns of Electricity Production: Lenin declared in 1920 that
‘Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country’. The
importance of the power sector to the economy was thus reflected in higher
electricity production before reform after which electricity production seems to have
declined due to declining consumption under economic slowdown. The fall in
national GDP (see figure 1) across the TECs after reform leading to lower electricity
demand might have lowered the electricity production. Figure 5 shows the nature of
declining power production for the CIS region during the early phase of transition
process with power production picking up after 2000. The Asian financial crisis seems
to have negatively affected the CIS region the most in terms of power production. A
decisive factor is the declining industrial demand for electricity among the energy‐
intensive industries during this period.
12
Bill collection is defined as the ratio of cash collected to the total amount billed while commercial
loss is defined as the non-billed consumption through illegal connection meter tampering and theft (so
called non-technical losses).
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Figure 5: Electricity Production across TECs (KWh) from 1993‐2008
Source: Own compilation

The numbers on net electricity imports in Table C (see Appendix I) also confirms that
electricity consumption in particular for Hungary and Poland fell sharply as
compared to electricity production during the early period of transition. The SEE
region at present as a whole is a net importer of electricity. However, the increasing
emphasis on regional market integration under excess capacity could encourage
more electricity production and benefit from it accordingly.
In an ideally functioning power market, power production should respond to power
demand largely reflecting the efficiency of power sector reforms and other
institutional changes in the economy.
Hypothesis 4: Power sector reforms and economy‐wider institutional reforms can
vary the overall volume of electricity production in an economy.
Similarly, the increasing importance on mitigating climate change impacts as a part
of broader energy policy goals by reducing carbon emissions combined with a need
to improve supply security could have increased the renewable energy production
across the transition regions. Figure 6 shows that electricity production in the CEB,
SEE and CIS region from different energy sources in 2007. The SEE region has the
largest renewable electricity production though thermal electricity production
dominates all regions. The CEB region produced the least amount of electricity from
nuclear sources (around 9%).

13

Figure 6: Electricity production by fuel types for CEB, SEE and CIS respectively (2007)
Source: Own compilation

Hypothesis 4.1: Power sector reforms and economy‐wider institutional reforms can
increase the overall volume of electricity production from renewable sources in the
transition countries.
e) High Energy Intensity: Historically, the energy consumed per unit of GDP in the
transition economies was estimated at four to eight times that of OECD countries
and the United States (Gray, 1995). The high energy intensity of the yesteryears can
be primarily attributed to the presence of many energy intensive industries and the
inefficiency of energy use spurred by lower power prices. Furthermore, the distorted
energy prices as discussed above and the soft budget constraints for industry (for
e.g. being debt free) also led to high energy use in the TECs. Figure 7 shows that CIS
countries such as Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan where electricity prices are very low
(see table D in appendix I) also have high energy intensity of GDP.

Figure 7: Energy intensity of GDP versus Carbon intensity of GDP in TECs
Source: Adapted from EBRD (2008)
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According to EBRD (2008), the CIS countries being the most energy intensive of all
have reduced their energy intensity by about one‐third since 1994. However, these
countries still use three times more energy as compared to Western Europe to
produce a unit of GDP in terms of purchasing power parities (PPP). Hence, there is a
significant potential in the TECS to be more energy efficient and eventually converge
at a similar levels with the OECD countries in terms of per capita consumption of
electricity.
Hypothesis 5: Power sector reforms and reforms of overall institutions in the
economy can reduce the overall energy intensity of GDP across the TECs.
f) High Carbon Emissions Intensity: In the past, many CEE and FSU countries relied
heavily on low‐quality and high polluting coal and lignite. While reliance on coal and
lignite was an alternative towards not being utterly dependent on Russian oil and gas;
it also meant high levels of carbon and sulphur emissions. For example, coal comprised
of 90% of all fuel used for power generation in Poland and 60% in the former Slovakian
Republic in 1995 (Gray, 1995). Figure 8 show that the transition countries met 6% of its
total energy consumption from renewable sources in 1999. While the CEB and SEE
countries consumed 7.5 mtoe of renewable energy; the number was 57.5 mtoe for CIS
countries.
Of the world’s 20 most carbon intensive economies, 13 countries belonging to the TECs
fall under this category (EIA, 2005). Kazakhstan and Russia are among the top 15
carbon polluters (CDIAC, 2005). Among all the countries in the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC), Kazakhstan, Ukraine and
Uzbekistan are the three most carbon intensive economy. Figure 7 also confirms that
there is significant scope for the TECs (especially the CIS countries including Mongolia)
to reduce the overall amount of carbon in the economy through fuel switching and
being more energy efficient which necessarily stems from appropriate power sector
reforms at a first place.
Hypothesis 6: Power sector reforms and wider institutional reforms in the economy can
be thus expected to reduce the overall level of carbon intensity of GDP in the TECs.
The role of electricity demand is also critical in understanding the economic,
operational and environmental aspects of power sector as electricity demand directly
or indirectly can shape power sector outcomes such as installed capacity, generation
and network investments, technical losses, energy intensity, carbon intensity and
overall electricity generation (Figure 8).
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In well‐functioning power markets, it can be expected that the power sector outcomes
such as (installed capacity, network investments) responds to the market signals
provided by total electricity demand13. On the other hand, the ability of the power
market to respond to market signals also depend on the timing and choice of policies.
The importance of electricity demand upon understanding the power sector gets
increasingly heightened as electricity demand post 2000 is continuing to rise across
TECs.

Figure 8: Total primary energy consumption in 1999/mtoe (million tonnes of oil equivalent)
Source: US Energy Information Administration (EIA)

Figure 9 illustrates that the per capita electricity consumption of the TECs is
eventually converging towards the levels of industrialised OECD countries. The
electricity demand also significantly went low in the CIS countries including Mongolia
before the onset of financial crisis until 2000. Under increasing electricity demand
scenario, the aim of this paper is to test for the above formulated hypotheses in
relation to the power sector reforms and the overall level of institutional
development in the TECs over‐time. The next section thoroughly describes the data
and econometric methodology used in this study.

13

In reality, total electricity demand differs from effective electricity demand as total demand can
remain unmet. On the other hand, effective electricity demand should equal electricity production as
what is produced is consumed and vice versa.
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Figure 9: Per capita electricity consumption in the TECs (2007)
Source: Adapted from EBRD (2008)

4. Data and Econometric Methodology
The objective of this paper is to study the link between power sector reforms and
wider institutional reforms in the economy since the start of the transition process
(i.e. 1990 till 2008) across the TECs. Thus, it is necessary to have a comprehensive set
of data that can serve as a measure of reform progress in the power sector as well as
the whole economy. For this purpose, we have used the ‘Transition Indicators’
developed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) that
measures the progress in transition through a set of transition indicators. The reform
assessments are made in nine areas encompassing 1) small scale privatization, 2)
large scale privatization, 3) governance and enterprise restructuring, 4) price
liberalisation, 5) trade and foreign exchange system, 6) competition policy, 7)
banking reform and interest rate liberalisation, 8) securities markets and non‐bank
financial institutions and 9) infrastructure that includes electric power, railways,
telecommunication, roads, water and waste water. The measurement scale for these
indicators ranges from 1 to 4+, where 1 represents little or no change from a rigid
centrally planned economy while 4+ represents the standards of an industrialized
market economy. The indicators mentioned above can be considered a broad
measure of wider economic ‘institutional’ progress as they include both elements of
institutional environment and institutional arrangements under the NIE (North,
1971; Williamson, 1971).
In order to suit the objective of the paper and given the differing importance of
various aspects of institutional development for an economy in transition; we
construct the following institutional indicators from the set of nine available
indicators as described below:
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•

•

•

•

•

Economic Governance Reform Index (EGRI): composite index based on un‐
weighted average of large scale privatization and corporate governance and
enterprise restructuring
Overall Market Liberalization Index (OMLI): composite index based on un‐
weighted average price liberalization, competition policy and trade and
foreign exchange system
Other Infrastructure Reform Index (OIRI): composite index based on un‐
weighted average of reform scores in roads, water and waste water and
telecommunication
Financial Reform Index (FRI): composite index based on un‐weighted average
of banking reform and interest rate liberalization and securities markets and
non‐bank financial institutions
Power Sector Reform Index (PRI): power sector reform index alone

Small scale privatization and reform in railways have been ignored in our study as we
believe small scale privatization is en‐route to large scale privatization and thus avoid
double‐counting. The size and nature of the industry may mean that power sector is
more prone to large scale privatization than small scale privatization. Railways have
been ignored because of many missing observations14. Since our aim is to analyze
the relationship between the institutional framework on macroeconomic and power
sector outcomes (economic, technical and environmental), the following
classification of outcome variables was made as described below15:
• Economic impacts: includes per capita GDP (PGDP) and per capita installed
capacity (PINSTC) and per capita renewable installed capacity (PRINSTC)
• Technical impacts: includes operational aspects namely per capita
transmission and distribution losses (PTDL) and per capita electricity
production (PEPDN) and per capita renewable production (PREPDN)
• Environmental impacts: includes carbon emissions intensity (CEI) and energy
intensity (EI)
GDP and installed capacity are classified under economic impacts as the former
measures the economic well‐being of an individual (i.e. per capita income) while the
latter measure is reflective of the capital investments devoted to electricity
generation and expansion capacity. We would have ideally liked to study the impact
14
EBRD (2001) in its transition report has also constructed a measure for institutional development
which is the composite index of unweighted average of transition indicators for 2001 comprising largescale privatization, governance and enterprise reform, competition policy, infrastructure and finance.
But, our construct of the institutional index will allow us to comment on the relative importance of
different institutional components.
15
It is to be understood that the above classification is not typically very distinct from one another as
the classifications can be highly correlated and hence debatable. But, for the sake of preciseness and
simplicity, we assume that the above classification holds true.
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of reforms on private investments in the electricity sector but the lack of a
comprehensive dataset on power sector private investments proved to be a major
constraint. Transmission and distribution (T&D) losses is largely due to technical
constraints in the grids and correlated to capital investments in the T&D
infrastructures. Likewise, electricity production can significantly depend upon the
available technology in place and also dependent on the available installed capacity
too. ‘Per capita’ approximation is used for all the above measures to homogenize the
effect of increasing population across all outcomes. Likewise, carbon intensity is a
direct measure of the amount of carbon emissions released in relation to GDP while
energy intensity is a measure of energy efficiency bearing enormous consequences
to the environment. As mentioned, these outcomes are to be studied accounting for
electricity consumption (demand).
The variables PGDP, PINSTC, PEPDN, PTDL, CEI, EI as well as the control variable i.e.
electricity demand, were logarithmic transformed. Electricity prices (both household
and industrial) is not included in our analysis for two reasons: a) the neoclassical
economic theory vastly relied on prices for the market to deliver its ‘goods’ so this
paper departs from neo‐classical theory by placing tremendous emphasis on
institutions and b) the lack of a reliable comprehensive data.
The time frame considered in this study ranges from 1990 to 2008. The year 1990
was the start of the massive transition process among the TECs while a
comprehensive data beyond 2008 was not available in the EBRD dataset. Annual
data is available for only 27 diverse transition countries where EBRD has been
actively involved. Some of these countries have already obtained a membership at
the EU while some are in the process of being an EU member and have the potential
for joining EU. Table 2 shows the status of the countries included in the sample in
terms of EU accession and that 15 out of 27 countries included in our sample are
associated with the EU. Turkey and Montenegro16 are excluded from our sample due
to data unavailability on the predictor and criterion variables respectively. Table 3
lists and describes the variables.
EU members

EU Candidate members

Potential Candidate
members
Albania, BIH, Montenegro,
Serbia

2004: Estonia, Hungary,
Croatia, FYR Macedonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Turkey
Slovakia, Slovenia
2007: Bulgaria, Romania
Table 2: EU associated countries in EBRD area of operation
Source: Own compilation
16

Montenegro only became an independent state from 3 June 2006.
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Type

Independent
Variables

Variables
PRI

Power reform index

OIRI

Other infrastructure
reform index
Financial reform
index
Economic
Governance reform
index
Overall market
liberalization index
Per capita
electricity
consumption
Per capita GDP or
per capita income

FRI
EGRI

OMLI
Control variable

LNPECS

LNPGDP
Dependent
variables

Units

Source

Scaled from 1 to
4+
Scaled from 1 to
4+
Scaled from 1 to
4+
Scaled from 1 to
4+

EBRD

Scaled from 1 to
4+
Kilowatt hour
(KWh)

EBRD

EBRD
EBRD
EBRD

CIA World Factbook

Constant 2000 US
dollars

World Development
Indicators (WDI)

LNPINSTC

Per capita installed
capacity

KWh per person

EIA

LNPRINSTC

Per capita
renewable installed
capacity

KW per person

EIA

LNPEPDN

Per capita
electricity
production
Per capita
renewable
electricity
production
Per capital
transmission and
distribution losses
Total carbon
emissions/GDP

KWh per person

EIA

KWh per person

EIA

KWh

WDI

Metric tons of
carbon dioxide
per Thousand
Year 2005 US
Dollars (market
exchange rates)
Btu per Year 2005
US Dollars
(market exchange
rates)
Total number

EIA

LNPREPDN

LNPTDLS

LCE

Conversion
variable

Description

LEI

Total energy
consumption/GDP

Population

Includes all
residents regardless
of legal status or
citizenship

EIA

WDI

Table 3: List and Description of variables
Source: Own Compilation
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Our dataset thus is an unbalanced panel comprising 27 cross‐sections (N) with short
time series (T) of 19 years observed from period 1990‐2008. The cross‐sections
represent a diverse set of countries with its own economic, political, cultural, etc.
system and history allowing every possibility for individual country‐specific
characteristics to influence the behavior of each. The panel data econometric
methods consisting fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) estimators are widely
used to account for unobserved heterogeneity in econometric literature. The FE and
RE estimators differ in the way the assumptions are made about the unobserved
heterogeneity. The RE estimator assumes that the composite error term (i.e. also
containing the individual effect) must be uncorrelated with the explanatory variable
and thus be treated as if they were a part of the error term. On the other hand FE
estimator uses a dummy for every individual country17 and thus overtly takes the
unobserved heterogeneity into account. Hence, the FE estimator is also popularly
known as the Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) estimator. So, the FE estimator
is a special case of the RE estimator in itself. The RE estimator where applicable (i.e.
provided the assumptions18 on the error term are met) is more efficient meaning
that it has the lowest variance amongst unbiased estimators. Accordingly, the FE
estimator is always consistent implying that the estimator converges in probability to
the true value of the parameter. A Hausman Test can be used to make an
appropriate choice upon applying RE and FE.
However, we have used the FE estimator in this paper because unobserved
heterogeneity such as culture, legal origin, geographical location, history etc. that are
fixed over time are likely to be correlated with the wider economic reforms taking
place in the economy. Under this case, the fundamental assumption of RE model is
violated and not useful. The data used in this study also does not represent a
random sample as ‘N’ is limited but represents a finite sample allowing the use of FE
estimator. A static FE model can be specified as yit = β0 + Xitβ + αi + uit which can be
estimated using commands ‘xtreg’ or ‘xtregar’ for AR (1) estimates in STATA.
But, it is necessary to understand that relationship between the institutional
framework and energy sector outcomes is a complex one as the creation of a
suitable institutional environment does not instantaneously lead to improved
outcomes. The behavior of dependent variables can depend upon the past values of
itself along with a set of independent and control variables (Bruno, 2005). Thus a
17

An alternative way to understand FE estimation would be by assigning country specific dummy
while performing a pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. On the other hand, a FE estimator
takes into account the temporal (i.e. within) variation of the relevant variables and hence produce
appropriate results when applied to variables that considerably vary over time.
18
The RE estimator is applicable on the assumption that the individual unobserved heterogeneity must
be uncorrelated with the regressors (explanatory variables).
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dynamic specification of the panel model can be specified as yit = Ωyit‐1 + Xitβ + αi +
uit where ‘Ω’is the coefficient of the lagged value of the dependent variable while ‘Xitβ’
represents the matrix of explanatory variables and coefficients. Hence, we use a
dynamic LSDV (i.e. FE) model in this study.
But, it is well established in econometric literature that a dynamic LSDV model with a
lagged dependent variable engenders biased estimates when ‘T’ is small as in our
case (for e.g. see Roodman, 2006). Thus, Kiviet (1995) devised a bias‐corrected LSDV
estimator applicable only for balanced panels which is generally understood to have
the lowest Root Mean Square Error(RMSE) for panels of all sizes (Bun and Kiviet,
2003). However, a version of bias‐corrected LSDV estimate (LSDVC) has been
developed by Bruno (2005) that can be applied under two fundamental assumptions:
a) it has a strictly exogenous selection rule and b) the error term ‘uit’ is classified as
‘an unobserved white noise disturbance’. Using ‘xtlsdvc’command in STATA, the
estimator first produces uncorrected LSDV estimates which then approximates the
sample bias of the estimator using Kiviet’s higher order asymptotic expansion
techniques (Bruno, 2005). The approximation terms are of no direct use for
estimation as they are all evaluated at the unobserved true parameter values. So,
the true parameter values are replaced by estimates from some consistent estimator
to make them work (Bruno, 2005). The preferred estimator is then plugged into the
bias approximations formulae while the resulting bias approximation estimates βi_hat
is subtracted to derive the corrected LSDV estimator as LSDVCi=LSDV‐ βi_hat where i=1
in STATA by default that indicates the accuracy of the bias approximation. The
consistent estimator to be chosen to initialize the bias corrections could vary
between the Anderson‐Hsiao (AH), Arellano‐Bond (AB) and Blundell‐Bond (BB)
estimators.
An alternative to dynamic LSDV panel estimates would be to use other consistent
Instrumental Variable (IV) and Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) estimators
as widely proposed in econometrics (Roodman, 2006). But, the relative performance
evaluation of LSDVC in comparison to LSDV, Anderson‐Hsiao, Arellano‐Bond and
Blundell‐Bond estimators by Bruno (2005) for unbalanced panels with small N
concludes that the STATA computed LSDVC version outperform all other estimators
in terms of RMSE and bias. We thus use the LSDVC model to test the formulated
hypotheses under section three that involved dynamic relationship and accordingly
report the results for all the estimators used to initialize the bias corrections
(Anderson‐Hsiao, Arellano‐Bond and Blundell‐Bond). The use of indexes based on
individual components score as regressors while considering electricity demand in an
economy as given largely confirms to the exogenous selection rule as required. The
standard test statistics along with the Arellano‐Bond test for first and second order
autocorrelation is reported. Under the null of no autocorrelation, the presence of
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second order autocorrelation would imply that the estimates are inconsistent. In
addition, the estimates of the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions reported by
the Blundell Bond estimator should test significantly from zero to reject the null that
overidentifying restrictions are valid. As an example on the empirical application of
the LSDVC estimator; Sen and Jamasb (2010) have performed an econometric
analysis of the determinants and impacts of electricity reform in India.
But, the model used in this paper is quite different from them as we also use the
interaction terms to assess the impacts of wider economic reforms and power sector
reforms on the energy and macroeconomic outcomes in the transition economies.
We would have also liked to incorporate time‐dummies in our model to capture any
event specific outcomes (for e.g. Asian financial crisis, EU joining etc.) but doing so
will severely limit the degrees of freedom in our analysis given the limited dataset.
Hence, we avoided using time dummies. Following Sen and Jamasb (2010), Zhang et
al. (2008)19 for electricity sector reform, the first model (model I) to be estimated to
test our hypotheses is:
Yit =ΩYit‐1 + PRIitβ1 + OIRIitβ2 + EGRIitβ3 + FRIitβ4 + OMLIitβ5 +
LNPECSitβ6 + αi + uit………………(1)
All dependent and independent variables except indexes have been logarithmic
transformed. We use per capita electricity consumption in our analysis as a control
variable as discussed above. As already mentioned the motives to reform the power
sector in the TECs were primarily external so reforms in external sector alone and in
relation to the power sector could have affected the macroeconomic and power
sector outcomes. In order to study so, it is necessary to introduce an interaction
term between the power sector reforms with wider economic institutional reforms
as specified in our second model (model II) below20:
Yit = ΩYit‐1 + PRIitβ1 + OIRIitβ2 + EGRIitβ3 + FRIitβ4 + OMLIitβ5 + LNPECSitβ6 +
OIRIit*PRIitβ7 + EGRIit*PRIitβ8 + PRIit*FRIitβ9 + PRIit*OMLIitβ10 + αi + uit……………….. (2)
Table 4 reports the descriptive variables used in our study. It can be well understood
from the table that the power sector in the TECs has been reformed the least in
relation to the standards of an industrialized market economy. The countries on
average seem to have fairly reformed the overall market liberalization of the
19

Zhang et al. (2008) have also used interactions terms in panel data regressions but they have used
static fixed effects on a large sample while we use dynamic fixed effects for a small sample with bias
correction.
20
Note that questions can be raised here regarding other possible interactions among regressors.
However, given our research objective as clearly stated in different sections of the paper, we have only
considered the interaction the power sector reform with other institutional reforms.
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economy. This might have been achieved by opening the market (i.e. open economy)
to significantly benefit from the increasing regional trading and integration.
However, disaggregating the diverse set of countries into different groups based on
their common characteristics (as in figure ten) would allow studying the relative
institutional reform progress more precisely than solely relying on the overall
average. The variables also proved to be stationary over the time period considered
in this study and thereby avoiding the pitfalls of spurious regressions. Table F in
appendix I reports the results from unit root tests based on the ‘ipshin’ module in
STATA as suggested by Im et al. (1995). The results confirm that the variables are
integrated of order one I(1) at 1% level of significance and thus stationary in their
first differences.
Variable
LNPRINSTC
LNPREPDN
LNPGDP
LNPINSTC
LNPEPDN
LNPTDLS
PRI
OIRI
EGRI
OMLI
FRI
CEI
EI
LNPECS

Mean

Standard
Minimum
Maximum
Deviation
‐2.211
2.061
‐8.526
0
5.407
2.315
‐5.195
8.013
7.360
0.992
4.805
9.532
‐0.141
0.474
‐2.282
0.809
‐5.801
0.513
‐7.108
‐4.502
‐7.782
0.431
‐8.977
‐6.663
1.994
0.814
1
3.67
2.013
0.796
1
3.92
2.236
0.855
1
3.84
2.949
0.888
1
4.22
2.065
0.810
1
4
2.560
2.139
0.368
11.523
46570
41249.45
7792.694
201994.7
7.866
0.515
5.979
8.873
Table 4: Table E: Descriptive statistics for the variables

No. of
observations
490
472
509
490
513
513
513
513
513
513
513
467
466
513

Figure 10 shows that liberalizing the economy as a whole (i.e. opening up trade,
establish proper competition policies and price liberalization in the economy) has
been on high agenda of reforms across all countries in transition. However, overall
price liberalization is the economy has not necessarily implied the price liberalization
in the power sector as all groups of countries considered are still a distant apart from
achieving a cost‐reflective electricity pricing21. The figure also depicts some degree of
institutional convergence among PRI, OIRI, EGRI and FRI variables across all CEB, SEE
and CIS member states. The CEB countries which includes 7 out of 9 EU members
21
According to EBRD, a PRI of 4 would indicate that the countries have engaged in full cost reflective
pricing of utilities services.
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included in our sample seem to have experienced a stagnation of institutional
reforms including the power sector reforms though the financial sector reforms is
following an upward trend. The SEE countries however exhibit an upward reform
trend in other institutional reforms expect for the power sector. The CIS countries on
the other hand depict a mixed scenario. The steep upward general trend in PRI
among CIS countries reveals that these countries have a lot of catching up to do in
relation to its counterparts in reforming the power sector. The overall market
liberalization process though seems to have flattened out post 2004 while reforms in
economic governance, other infrastructures and financial sector are gaining pace.
A detailed analysis of EU members in particular gives a much more apparent outlook
on the power sector reforms. Power sector reforms seem to have sped up after
financial crisis till the EU accession in 2004 (Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) before a brief moment of respite. The reforms process
again gained pace probably with Bulgaria and Romania in the process of joining
EU22.However, after 2005 power sector reforms appears to have stagnated among
the EU members while other institutional reforms considered in our study looks
slowly showing an upward trend. Likewise, the power sector reform gained pace in
the EU (potential) candidates (Albania, BIH, Montenegro, Serbia, Croatia, FYR
Macedonia) after 2000 but stagnation looms post 2005. Other institutional reforms
in the EU candidate countries are showing an upward trend. Hence the motives of
joining EU indeed acted as incentives to speed up the power sector reforms across
these countries.
A further analysis of the oil and gas rich countries included in our sample (namely
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan) shows that power sector reform
gained pace after 2000 with a reversal around 2004 and thus stagnation after 2005.
While reforms in other infrastructures (i.e. other utilities) is speeding up, reforms in
overall market liberalization, economic governance and financial sector reform
seems to have stalled. Although a detailed econometric analysis of these groups as
per the above classification is not viable under a small data set, the next section
presents and discusses the econometric results testing the formulated hypotheses
under section two23 using Model I and Model II.

22
23

They eventually joined in 2007.
Table E in Appendix I reports the correlation results for the independent variables used in this study.
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CEB

SEE

CIS

EU members

EU candidates

Energy‐rich countries
Figure 10: Graphical analysis of economy‐wide reform progress
Source: Own compilation based on EBRD
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5. Results
This section presents and discusses the econometric results from the hypotheses
testing based on model (I) and model (II)24 using the ‘LSDVC’ technique as described
in section 3. The results are classified under the economic, operational and
environmental impacts of power sector and other institutional reforms. Model (I)
explains the ‘on its own’ impact of reforms alone over‐time while Model (II) explains
the outcomes also accounting for different interactions between the power sector
reforms and other institutional reforms. In both models, per capita electricity
consumption was used as a control variable.
a) The Economic impacts of reform: Per capita GDP, per capita installed capacity and
per capita renewable installed capacity were considered as the outcomes variables
to assess the economic impacts of power sector reforms and wider institutional
reform in the TECs. Test results of hypotheses 1, 2 and 2.1 are discussed below.
i) Hypothesis 1: The results in table 5 shows that the lagged value of GDP is
significant implying that last year’s GDP had a significant effect on these years GDP
across the transition countries. Power sector reform on its own, does not bring about
a change in per capita GDP. However, accounting for different interactions between
power sector reforms and other institutional reforms; the power sector reforms
significantly affected the GDP. Interestingly, electricity reforms when considered
along with overall market liberalization reforms had a significant negative effect on
per capita GDP. This could be explained on the grounds that competition policy in
the transition countries is much less advanced than the reforms in the power sector
when competition policy is an essential part of any electricity reform as market
oriented reforms renders greater responsibilities to competition authorities to
implement reforms (Pollitt, 2009). Such results portray the complexities involving the
power sector reforms and thus the need to consider wider institutional aspects
surrounding power sector reforms. Likewise, reforms in other infrastructures
(telecommunication, water and roads), economic governance (large scale
privatization and enterprise restructuring), and overall market liberalization (opening
up trade, liberalizing prices under certain competition policy) all produced a
significant impact on per capita GDP. Thus, in some ways it can be inferred that
regional integration and increasing cross‐border trading of goods and services
(including the energy trade) proved favorable in terms of boosting national GDP. But,
it is not clear from our results upon which aspect of institutional reform in particular
was the most important in influencing the national GDP and which countries gained
24

The interaction term in this study has been derived by multiplying the indexes under consideration.
However, an alternative approach of contructing the interation term by considering the average
deviation from the mean also performed although the results were not significantly different. Thus, we
applied the former one in the paper.
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or lost. Nonetheless, countries that had the macroeconomic motives to reform their
power sector benefited when power sector reforms took place in conjunction with
institutional reforms as suggested by our results.
Per capita electricity consumption also has a significant effect on per capita GDP in
the transition countries confirming that these countries are energy‐intensive. The
traces of decade’s long experience of the economy overtly riding on cheap and state
subsidized energy in the transition countries seems to be still present as confirmed
by the overall results25.

Variables
L.LNPGDP
PRI
OIRI
EGRI
OMLI
FRI
LNPECS
PRI*OIRI
PRI*EGRI
PRI*OMLI
PRI*FRI

Impact of reforms on per capita GDP
Anderson‐Hsiao
Arellano‐Bond
Model I
Model II
Model I Model II
0.896*** 0.893*** .935*** 0.967***
(0.038)
(0.002)
(0.030)
(0.041)
0.003
0.125*** 0.005
0.060***
(0.005)
(0.021)
(0.004)
(0.020)
0.030*** 0.049**
0.009
0.044**
(0.007)
(0.021)
(0.007)
(0.018)
0.068*** 0.051*
0.012*
0.009
(0.007)
(0.027)
(0.006)
(0.023)
0.063*** 0.015
.015**
0.016
(0.007)
(0.019)
(0.006)
(0.017)
0.009
0.020
0.007
0.019
(0.298)
(0.031)
(0.274)
(0.027)
0.171*** 0.073*** 0.004
0.006
(0.011)
(0.011)
(0.011)
(0.012)
‐0.025
‐0.015
(0.010)
(0.009)
‐0.002
0.001
(0.013)
(0.011)
‐.051***
‐0.008
(0.117)
(0.011)
‐0.008
‐0.001
(0.015)
(0.013)

Blundell‐Bond
Model I
Model II
0.975*** 0.942***
(0.043)
(0.031)
0.003
0.099***
(0.008)
(0.027)
0.006
0.057*
(0.010)
(0.031)
0.016*
0.019
(0.008)
(0.031)
0.016
0.024
(0.008)
(0.021)
0.005
0.016
(0.010)
(0.031)
0.035**
0.042**
(0.004)
(0.025)
‐0.022
(0.015)
‐0.006
(0.015)
‐0.017
(0.017)
‐0.042
(0.124)

*, **, *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively26
Table 5: Test results for Hypothesis 1

25

Though not shown in the paper, we also perform an OLS and FE (i.e. LSDV) estimations and
compare the results to determine the nature of bias for each hypothesis. In all cases, bias was observed
as OLS and FE does not take endogeneity into account.
26
The bootstrapped standard errors are reported in brackets. We have performed a third order bias
correction while the number of bootstrapping repetitions has been confined to 50 depending on the
number of observations.

28

ii) Hypothesis 2: Per capita generation installed capacity remained fairly inelastic to
power sector reforms and per capita electricity consumption in the transition
countries. The reason could be due to the excess generation capacity of the past
implying that there is no urgency to invest in capacity expansion. The one‐lagged
coefficient is also significant indicating that last year’s capacity is an important
indicator for the current year’s capacity. All other institutional coefficients except
EGRI (with and without the interaction terms) are insignificant in explaining any
changes in per capita installed capacity. However, the economic governance index
(large scale privatization and corporate governance with enterprise restructuring) is
negatively significant to per capita installed capacity. The result reveals the rampant
power sector privatization as a ‘shock therapy’ that took place in the yesteryears
with the sole motive of raising revenue. In most cases, privatization occurred without
any appropriate framework for privatization itself (e.g. appropriate legal structure, a
proper regulatory and completion framework etc.).

Variables
L.LNPINSTC
PRI
OIRI
EGRI
OMLI
FRI
LNPECS
PRI*OIRI
PRI*EGRI
PRI*OMLI
PRI*FRI

Impact of reforms on per capita installed capacity
Anderson‐Hsiao
Arellano‐Bond
Blundell‐Bond
Model I
Model II
Model I
Model II
Model I
Model II
0.918*** 0.911*** 0.924*** 0.916*** 1.176***
1.16***
(0.154)
(0.148)
(0.030)
(0.033)
(0.016)
(0.018)
0.006
0.028
0.005
0.015
0.023
‐0.018
(0.018)
(0.074)
(0.010)
(0.037)
(0.015)
(0.053)
0.007
0.030
0.007
0.035
‐0.001
0.083.
(0.023)
(0.060)
(0.016)
(0.042)
(0.023)
(0.044)
‐0.032
‐0.091*
‐.034**
‐.085**
‐0.056***
‐0.086
(0.020)
(0.054)
(0.013)
(0.037)
(0.014)
(0.047)
0.009
0.045
0.009
0.039
0.016
‐0.003
(0.021)
(0.057)
(0.013)
(0.034)
(0.017)
(0.044)
0.015
0.014
0.018
0.003
0.022
‐0.024
(0.019)
(0.076)
(0.016)
(0.047)
(0.290)
(0.067)
0.018
0.073
0.018
0.021
‐0.018
‐0.018
(0.037)
(0.011)
(0.018)
(0.021)
(0.019)
(0.020)
‐0.017
‐0.019
‐0.047
(0.027)
(0.029)
(0.022)
‐0.036
0.031
‐0.017
(0.029)
(0.019)
(0.024)
‐.021
‐0.016
‐0.017
(0.031)
(0.018)
(0.017)
‐0.002
‐0.005
0.022
(0.041)
(0.023)
(0.029)

*, **, *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively
Table 6: Test results for Hypothesis 2
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While such privatization indeed raised money for the government, the receipts from
privatization was not primarily necessarily channelized in adding more generation
capacity while some privately owned ones might have shut down to low power
prices and inability to recover the cost. Stiglitz (1999) explains the so‐called ‘the
velvet globe of privatization’ where privatization occurred backdoors with ill‐motives
resulting in mass corruption. Thus, mass privatization of the power sector with a
motive to add generation capacity has defied the logics in the transition countries as
per our results (see table 6 below).
iii) Hypothesis 2.1: Following earlier results and explanation, the lagged value of per
capita renewable installed capacity is significant while all other variables including
the power sector reforms but excluding the financial sector reforms seems to be
insignificant in bringing about changes in per capital renewable installed capacity.
Table 7 shows that financial sector reforms on its own are crucial in generating
additional renewable capacity.
Impact of reforms on renewable per capita installed capacity
Variables
Anderson‐Hsiao
Arellano‐Bond
Blundell‐Bond
Model I
Model II
Model I
Model II
Model I
Model II
L.LNRPINSTC
1.145*** 1.018*** 1.076*** 1.078*** 1.079*** 1.078***
(0.024)
(0.043)
(0.016)
(0.018)
(0.011)
(0.012)
PRI
‐0.022
‐0.121
‐0.008
‐0.055
‐0.008
‐0.062
(0.023)
(0.093)
(0.021)
(0.069)
(0.018)
(0.059)
OIRI
0.010
‐0.013
‐0.004
‐0.059
‐0.001
‐0.063
(0.033)
(0.087)
(0.030)
(0.070)
(0.027)
(0.063)
EGRI
‐0.017
‐0.067
‐0.027
‐0.042
‐0.026
‐0.047
(0.023)
(0.079)
(0.022)
(0.065)
(0.021)
(0.060)
OMLI
0.001
‐0.029
‐0.003
0.004
‐0.004
‐0.004
(0.028)
(0.067)
(0.025)
(0.059)
(0.022)
(0.054)
FRI
0.034*
0.087
0.057*
0.076
0.055**
0.093
(0.030)
(0.101)
(0.030)
(0.082)
(0.026)
(0.075)
LNPECS
‐0.044
‐0.023
‐0.028
‐0.032
‐0.022
0.022
(0.044)
(0.048)
(0.034)
(0.033)
(0.031)
(0.030)
PRI*OIRI
‐0.001
0.022
0.026
(0.038)
(0.032)
(0.029)
PRI*EGRI
‐0.018
0.008
0.012
(0.043)
(0.034)
(0.031)
PRI*OMLI
0.033
0.004
0.007
(0.031)
(0.032)
(0.029)
PRI*FRI
‐0.015
‐0.015
‐0.024
(0.049)
(0.406)
(0.036)

*, **, *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively
Table 7: Test results for Hypothesis 2.1
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The adoption of renewable technology is costly with high sunk costs so the
availability of finance plays a crucial role. Banking reforms with interest rate
liberalization and the development of several non‐bank financial institutions (such as
cooperatives) might have facilitated easy borrowing and much needed access to
funds thereby promoting investments in renewable capacity. An important lesson to
be learnt here is that the long run transition towards a low carbon economy with the
widespread adoption of renewable is likely to also depend on the overall financial
sector reforms in the transition economies.
b) The Technical Impacts of reform: Per capita transmission and distribution losses,
per capita overall electricity production. and per capita renewable electricity
production were considered as performance outcomes to assess the operational and
technical impacts of power sector and other economic institutional reforms. The
results obtained from hypotheses tests (3, 4 and 4.1) are presented and discussed
below accordingly.
i) Hypothesis 3: The results from table 8 shows that power sector reform ‘on its own’
does not have a significant effect on reducing the per capita T&D losses but inclusion
of interactions in the model would do so. The lagged value is also significant implying
prior years’ losses have significant bearings on current year’s losses. Overall market
liberalization has significantly increased the T&D losses in the transition countries.
The argument can be supported on the grounds that cross‐border power trade has
significantly increased in the transition countries after market liberalization. For
instance, the SEE region electricity imports increased from 1837 GWh to 5549 GWh
between 1995 and 2002.
With old grids waiting for upgrading and maintenance in several countries, power
losses might be proportional to the volume of imports (i.e. to the amount of
electricity passing through the grid). However, overall market reform when
complemented with power sector reform has reduced the T&D losses across the
TECs. One way to counter the inefficiency of power losses would be to harmonize
power sector reforms with the overall market reforms (price liberalization, open
trading and competition policy) as shown by our results.
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Impact of reforms on per capita transmission and distribution losses
Variables
Anderson‐Hsiao
Arellano‐Bond
Blundell‐Bond
Model I
Model II
Model I
Model II
Model I
Model II
L.LNPTDLS
0.781*** 0.783*** 0.818*** 0.809*** 0.928*** 0.911***
(0.065)
(0.066)
(0.039)
(0.042)
(0.031)
(0.036)
PRI
‐0.023
‐0.180
‐0.018
‐0.159*
‐0.028
‐0.191**
(0.045)
(0.135)
(0.026)
(0.089)
(0.027)
(0.089)
OIRI
‐0.020
‐0.053
‐0.020
‐0.059
‐0.009
‐0.033
(0.059)
(0.122)
(0.032)
(0.076)
(0.027)
(0.078)
EGRI
‐0.004
‐0.046
‐0.005
‐0.048
‐0.005
‐0.075
(0.053)
(0.124)
(0.032)
(0.082)
(0.034)
(0.084)
OMLI
0.065
0.202**
0.060**
0.195***
0.058**
0.207***
(0.046)
(0.097)
(0.027)
(0.066)
(0.028)
(0.067)
FRI
‐0.024
‐0.031
‐0.026
‐0.043
‐0.032
‐0.025
(0.030)
(0.161)
(0.030)
(0.109)
(0.031)
(0.107)
LNPECS
‐0.043
0.053
‐0.0489
0.053
‐0.034
0.051
(0.074)
(0.068)
(0.040)
(0.043)
(0.038)
(0.040)
PRI*OIRI
0.025
0.026
0.023
(0.059)
(0.038)
(0.039)
PRI*EGRI
0.029
0.029
0.048
(0.061)
(0.039)
(0.041)
PRI*OMLI
‐0.106*
‐0.105**
‐0.118***
(0.090)
(0.040)
(0.041)
PRI*FRI
0.006
0.009
‐0.024
(0.081)
(0.053)
(0.036)

*, **, *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively
Table 8: Test results for Hypothesis 3
ii) Hypothesis 4: Power sector reform significantly affects per capita electricity
production only after controlling for possible interaction across different institutional
variables. The short history of electricity production (year before) also significantly
determines the current year’s per capita production across the TECs. Overall market
liberalization also seems to have brought about a significant effect in per capita
electricity production. Increasing regional power trade with the creation of power
exchanges in Europe as a whole coupled with increasing cross border trade of oil and
gas (as a fuel to generate electricity) from the energy‐rich countries in transition
could explain the overall increase in power trade volumes.
Large scale privatization and enterprise restructuring in relation to power sector
reforms also produced significant results in overall electricity production as shown in
Table 9.
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Variables
L.LNPEPDN
PRI
OIRI
EGRI
OMLI
FRI
PRI*OIRI
PRI*EGRI
PRI*OMLI
PRI*FRI

Impact of reforms on per capita electricity production
Anderson‐Hsiao
Arellano‐Bond
Blundell‐Bond
Model I
Model II
Model I
Model II
Model I
Model II
0.518*** 0.519*** 0.578*** 0.809*** 0.810***
0.848***
(0.061)
(0.050)
(0.030)
(0.042)
(0.026)
(0.029)
‐0.031
0.120
‐0.003
0.133*
0.015
0.159**
(0.082)
(0.909)
(0.015)
(0.050)
(0.018)
(0.089)
0.019
0.089
0.019
0.086
0.011
0.150
(0.101)
(0.760)
(0.020)
(0.044)
(0.025)
(0.058)
‐0.008
‐0.073
‐0.007
‐0.078
‐0.017
‐0.116
(0.100)
(0.811)
(0.017)
(0.047)
(0.025)
(0.063)
‐0.007
0.062
‐0.002
0.074**
0.026
0.084*
(0.085)
(0.645)
(0.017)
(0.037)
(0.021)
(0.050)
0.026
0.010
0.024
0.012
0.019
0.019
(0.030)
(1.09)
(0.019)
(0.061)
(0.021)
(0.077)
‐0.031
‐0.029
‐0.067
(0.368)
(0.021)
(0.029)
0.038
0.042*
0.057*
(0.396)
(0.022)
(0.030)
‐0.055
‐0.063
‐0.049
(0.392)
(0.022)
(0.041)
0.013
0.011
0.008
(0.524
(0.030)
(0.036)

*, **, *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively
Table 9: Test results for Hypothesis 4
iii) Hypothesis 4.1: The test results from table 10 reports that overall market
liberalization on its own had a significant negative impact on per capita renewable
electricity production. The result is not surprising on the fact that the abundant
availability and cross‐border movement of conventional energy sources like oil, gas
and fuel in the region have installed reluctance among countries to significantly
invest in renewable energy sources to improve the overall supply security. The high
cost of renewable production could be a barrier to invest in these technologies. The
argument is supported on the grounds that financial sector reform on its own
significantly affects the per capita renewable electricity production. Earlier results on
financial sector reform significantly affecting the per capita installed renewable
electricity capacity provide some evidence of robustness to this finding.
Model II suggests that the interaction between power sector reform and other
infrastructures reform can significantly influence per capita renewable electricity
production. The TECs primarily rely on hydro as a major source of renewable energy
and reforms in the water sector (included under other infrastructure) have
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important bearings. On the other hand, per capita overall electricity consumption
being insignificant to per capita renewable electricity production imply that there is
not much demand for renewable electricity in the transition countries at a first
place27. The lagged value is significant following earlier results.
Impact of reforms on per capita renewable electricity production
Variables
Anderson‐Hsiao
Arellano‐Bond
Blundell‐Bond
Model I
Model II
Model I
Model II
Model I
Model II
L.LNPREPDN
0.710*** 0.729*** 0.701*** 0715***
0.759***
0.779***
(0.046)
(0.044)
(0.029)
(0.031)
(0.027)
(0.028)
PRI
‐0.082
‐0.296
‐0.087
‐0.300
‐0.070
‐0.250
(0.061)
(0.250)
(0.055)
(0.222)
(0.064)
(0.254)
OIRI
‐0.111
‐0.541
‐0.093
‐0.494
‐0.165
‐0.702
(0.080)
(0.214)
(0.068)
(0.205)
(0.080)
(0.227)
EGRI
0.137
0.440
0.135
0.394
0.159
0.553
(0.093)
(0.202)
(0.085)
(0.197)
(0.100)
(0.224)
OMLI
‐0.163*
‐0.259
‐0.170**
‐0.250
‐0.153
‐0.304
(0.089)
(0.196)
(0.076)
(0.187)
(0.088)
(0.210)
FRI
0.216**
0.254
0.218*** 0.245
0.200**
0.350
(0.030)
(0.279)
(0.083)
(0.268)
(0.093)
(0.297)
LNPECS
0.208
0.178
0.204
0.188
0.223
0.211
(0.163)
(0.163)
(0.150)
(0.153)
(0.172)
(0.169)
PRI*OIRI
0.219**
0.199**
0.284**
(0.101)
(0.098)
(0.109)
PRI*EGRI
‐0.180
‐0.150
‐0.234
(0.111)
(0.107)
(0.121)
PRI*OMLI
0.085
0.078
0.105
(0.102)
(0.097)
(0.111)
PRI*FRI
‐0.038
‐0.040
‐0.092
(0.135)
(0.127)
(0.141)

*, **, *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively
Table 10: Test results for Hypothesis 4.1
c) The Environmental Impacts of Reform: Carbon emission intensity and energy
consumption intensity were considered as a measure to assess the environmental
impacts of power sector reforms and wider economic reforms since 1990.
Hypotheses 5 and 6 were tested with the results being presented below:
i) Hypothesis 5: The test results on carbon emission intensity in table 11 show that
all other institutional variables except for reforms in other infrastructure have no
significant bearing on carbon emissions intensity. Water sector reforms can to some
27

It may also mean that renewable electricity capacity is not connected to the grid.
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extent also detect the use of water to generate electricity while hydroelectricity has
been the dominant from of renewable energy sources in the transition countries.
Thus, progress in water sector reforms may mean a reduction the carbon intensity.
However, water sector reforms on its own are unable to influence the emissions
intensity.
Per capita electricity consumption in the transition countries has also been driving
the emission intensity as nuclear and thermal sources dominate electricity
generation across these countries as shown by our results. Likewise, the previous
level of carbon intensity also has a role to play in determining the current level of
intensity with the lagged coefficient being significant.

Variables
L.LCEI
PRI
OIRI
EGRI
OMLI
FRI
LNPECS
PRI*OIRI
PRI*EGRI
PRI*OMLI
PRI*FRI

Impact of reforms on carbon emissions intensity
Anderson‐Hsiao
Arellano‐Bond
Blundell‐Bond
Model I
Model II
Model I
Model II
Model I
Model II
0.892***
0.832*** 0.890*** 0.866*** 0.852*** 0.897***
(0.040)
(0.038)
(0.030)
(0.018)
(0.026)
(0.027)
‐0.022
‐0.425
0.042
‐0.186
0.059
‐0.197
(0.023)
(0.393)
(0.078)
(0.069)
(0.081)
(0.027)
‐0.051
‐0.564*
‐0.115
‐0.059**
‐0.128
‐0.553**
(0.094)
(0.029)
(0.030)
(0.070)
(0.027)
(0.066)
0.193
0.180
0.132
0.0157
0.142
0.148
(0.014)
(0.034)
(0.090)
(0.052)
(0.094)
(0.062)
‐0.025
‐0.134
0.014
0.080
0.033
0.059
(0.013)
(0.079)
(0.078)
(0.219)
(0.081)
(0.224)
‐0.154
0.124
‐0.151
‐0.056
‐0.161
‐0.020
(0.140)
(0.338)
(0.119)
(0.269)
(0.122)
(0.273)
0.327*
0.323*
0.028***
0.338**
0.369***
0.353**
(0.080)
(0.088)
(0.034)
(0.032)
(0.041)
(0.043)
0.205
0.210
0.192
(0.047)
(0.021)
(0.025)
0.007
‐0.007
0.001
(0.060)
(0.034)
(0.037)
0.136
‐0.001
0.022
(0.060)
(0.030)
(0.035)
‐0.179
‐0.083
‐0.101
(0.060)
(0.029)
(0.043)

*, **, *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively
Table 11: Test results for Hypothesis 5
ii) Hypothesis 6: Apart from the lagged value being significant, power sector reform
on its own did not yield a significant impact on energy intensity. However, EGRI is
significant in increasing energy intensity as large scale privatization can increase
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overall industrial activities in an economy raising overall energy demand. Likewise,
energy intensity also remains inelastic to all other institutional variables. However,
accounting for the interactions among certain institutional variables as per model II,
reforms in power sector and reforms in other infrastructure had a negative
significant impact on energy intensity. Energy intensity is a direct measure of energy
efficiency and meaningful reforms of the power sector and other infrastructures that
heavily rely on electricity can significantly reduce the energy intensity by promoting
a rational consumption of energy as shown in Table 12.

Variables
L.LEI
PRI
OIRI
EGRI
OMLI
FRI
PRI*OIRI
PRI*EGRI
PRI*OMLI
PRI*FRI

Impact of reforms on energy intensity
Anderson‐Hsiao
Arellano‐Bond
Model I
Model II
Model I
Model II
0.833***
0.863***
0.855***
0.851***
(0.045)
(0.042)
(0.037)
(0.042)
0.024
‐0.273*
0.023
‐0.046*
(0.022)
(0.097)
(0.016)
(0.075)
‐0.053
‐0.133**
‐0.064***
‐0.165**
(0.022)
(0.114)
(0.020)
(0.056)
0.051*
0.097
0.047**
0.088
(0.030)
(0.074)
(0.022)
(0.055)
‐0.023
‐0.228
‐0.031
‐0.069
(0.022)
(0.070)
(0.019)
(0.050)
‐0.027
0.159
‐0.031
0.023
(0.031)
(0.083)
(0.022)
(0.067)
0.047
0.048
(0.039)
(0.028)
‐0.017
‐0.024
(0.040)
(0.029)
0.134
0.029
(0.050)
(0.033)
‐0.083
‐0.031
(0.039)
(0.029)

Blundell‐Bond
Model I
Model II
0.982***
0.924***
(0.028)
(0.031)
0.027
‐0.077*
(0.017)
(0.081)
‐0.047**
‐0.115*
(0.021)
(0.061)
0.050**
0.077
(0.023)
(0.058)
‐0.017
0.057
(0.020)
(0.072)
‐0.012
1776.14
(0.024)
(4766.55)
0.032
(0.031)
‐0.017
(0.030)
0.047
(0.036)
‐0.036
(0.031)

*, **, *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively
Table 12: Test results for Hypothesis 8
5.1 Summary of results
The results from the hypotheses tests reveal mixed findings. In most cases as shown
by earlier results; power sector reform did not directly influence the outcomes
related to the power sector. The reasons could be because of: a) although reforms
have been agreed on paper; the implementation of reforms have been rather weak
to influence any outcome significantly b) the complexities and intricacies of power
sector reform and as a part of wider economic reform was not understood or largely
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ignored and c) the 19 years’ time‐frame considered in our study is still not sufficient
enough to capture the effectiveness of the reform process across the TECs.
The legacy of central planning may have translated into slow willingness towards
reform. The first post‐communist governments in some SEE (Belarus) and many CIS
countries (Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) were led by the same political elites under
communism delaying the overall progress in transition to preserve their status‐quo.
Elsewhere in Bosnia and Herzegovina, FR Yugoslavia and Tajikistan; overall reforms
including the reforms in the power sector has been slower as these countries had to
do some ‘catch up’ due to civil war and ethnic‐conflicts. Regional integration via EU
membership have successfully catapulted power sector reforms as these countries
with common geography, history and culture created the appropriate institutions
that allowed international integration to complement domestic reforms.
It is also evident from our results that the relationship between power sector
reforms and power sector outcomes is not straightforward or linear and only tends
to work under well‐defined overall institutional framework. For instance, adding new
renewable generation capacity and hence increasing the production of renewable
energy is only successful when supported by the broader financial sector reforms
and reforms in other infrastructures (that includes the water sector). In line with
Easterly and Levine (2003), our results support the view that power sector reforms
where successful are only able to do so by adopting broader institutional framework
to support the reforms.
However, the result is always not automatic or guaranteed. Countries such as
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia and Tajikistan though have infantry
institution development as per the EBRD score have not lost much in terms of power
sector outcomes such as energy intensity and emissions intensity primarily because
of a) large hydro plants as renewable resources28 and b) less energy‐intensive
industries. Nonetheless, one important lesson to be learnt is that the
implementation democratic market‐oriented reforms in the absence of appropriate
institutions may not produce the desired consequences. The results also to some
extent supports the view that ‘gradualism’ with proper reforms sequencing can
perform better than hastily applied ‘shock therapy reforms’.
It is necessary for policymakers to understand that not everything is important and
everything should not be done at once. For example, misguided large scale
privatization under weak governance structure created and preserved vested
interests in the Russian power sector. Our results in general show a negative
28

For Albania and Georgia, the share of renewable electricity generated from renewable sources
exceeds 80 percent.
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significant relationship between economic governance index and per capita
generation capacity.
6. Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to explore the link or association between between power
sector reforms and wider economic reforms in assessing the macroeconomic and the
power sector outcomes (economic, operational and environmental) across the
transition countries. We focused on the relatively ignored role of institutions that
market oriented policies tend to heavily rely upon to work better than solely relying
on prices as assumed under the neoclassical theory. Our findings from the
econometric analysis were also based on the composite ‘institutional indexes’
constructed accordingly. While the construction of such institutional index might
vary across research and econometric methodology as per the discretion of the
researchers; the essence of our results is expected to be preserved to a large extent.
The results support the view that electricity sector reform is indeed a complicated
process primarily due to its dependency upon broader institutional framework in the
economy. The link or association between power sector reforms and other
institutional reform is not as lucid and direct as policymakers would have liked. Thus,
a failure to understand the institutional aspects of electricity sector reform
combined with adopting emulated reforms under differing institutional capacity
delayed the process of reform being effective. The effects from successful electricity
reform experiences was a good opportunity to learn but under differing institutional
contexts which the transition countries failed to internalize immediately. Thus, the
need to formulate priority driven reforms rather than theory driven reforms based
on individual capacity, resources and needs is what the developing world can learn
from the ongoing massive reform experiment in the TECs. On this note, it is critical if
the benchmark set to the transition countries to achieve the standards of that of an
industrialized economy (Norway, UK, etc.) is a valid one.
Nonetheless, the learning from the lessons of reforms within the transition countries
is being actively pursued as many countries seem to have sped up their power sector
reforms post 2000 though with stagnation witnessed after 2005. While so much has
been said in the past regarding the pacing and sequencing of power sector reforms
(i.e. intra sector reforms); the message is clear from our study that only those
countries that have been able to synchronize reforms across sectors (i.e.
harmonizing power sector reforms with other institutional) reforms or in the process
of doing so have gained significantly in terms of power sector and broader
macroeconomic outcomes. The main lesson to be learnt by the rest of the
developing world is electricity sector reform falls within the domain of wider
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economic reforms. Thus, overall health of economic institutions and the rigidity of
the institutional framework matters for power sector reforms to succeed as a whole.
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Appendix I:
Table A: Statistics on Resource dependence for selected TECs in 2000
Source: Adapted from EBRD (2001)
Oil and gas export (% of
total exports)
Oil and gas export(% of
total GDP)

Azerbaijan
85.2

Kazakhstan
46.8

Russia
50.4

Turkmenistan
81

Uzbekistan
12.3

30.5

24.7

21.5

68.7

4.3

Table B: GDP and Energy Consumption (1990‐1994)
Source: Adapted from Gray (1995)
Groups

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

CEE GDP
CEE Energy Consumption
Russia GDP
Russia Energy Consumption
FSU GDP
FSU Energy Consumption

‐1.1
‐2.1
‐2.0
0.8
‐2.3
1.9

‐10.3
‐9.6
‐9.0
‐1.8
‐9.1
‐2.4

‐4.1
‐4.1
‐19.0
‐6.7
‐18.2
‐8.0

0.6
‐1.6
‐11.9
‐6.6
‐9.7
‐8.7

4.7
0.7
‐14.9
‐9.9
‐15.8
‐10.4

Table C: Net imports of electricity in selected TECs in TWh from 1988‐94
Source: Adapted from Stern and Davis (1997)
Countries
Hungary
Poland
Bulgaria
Romania
Russia
Ukraine
Kazakhstan

1988
+11.3
+4.5
+4.5
+7.2
na
na
na

1992
+7.3
‐2.5
+2.1
+7.0
1008.5
255.5
82.7

1994
33.5
135.3
‐0.1
+0.7
875.9
209.1
66.8

Table D: Prices, cash collections and commercial losses in selected TECs
Source: Adapted from Kennedy (2001)
Countries
Albania
Armenia
Estonia
Hungary
Romania
Bulgaria
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Georgia
Tajikistan
Uzbekistan
Turkmenistan

Residential
price (USc/kwh)
2.9
4.4
4.9
6.8
5.2
3.7
5.6
4.2
0.2
0.7
0.5

Industrial price
(USc/kwh)
7.2
2.9
4.1
5.7
4.8
3.9
6.1
3.3
1.1
0.7
0.5

Bill collection
(%)
84.5
87
97.1
90
62
85
95
32
na
25
30

Commercial
losses (%)
11.2
30
1.1
na
2
10
11.5
27.5
14
na
na
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Table E: Correlation matrix for the independent variables
PRI
OIRI
EGRI
OMLI
FRI
LNPECS

PRI
1.00
0.53
0.34
0.43
0.38
0.19

OIRI

EGRI

OMLI

FRI

LNPECS

1.00
0.52
0.57
0.65
0.28

1.00
0.36
0.58
0.22

1.00
0.31
0.10

1.00
0.32

1.00

At 1%, the critical value is ‐1.96.
Table F: Results for ‘IPShin’ panel unit root tests
Variables
t‐bar
statistics

LNPINSTC
‐2.375

LNPRINSTC
‐2.963

LNPGDP
‐2.940

LNPEPDN
‐2.571

LNPREPDN
‐2.373

LNPECS
‐2.370

LNPTDLS
‐2.178
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Appendix II:
Hypothesis 1
Estimator
AB

BB

Hypothesis 2
Estimator
AB

BB

Test
1 order
autocorrelation
2nd order
autocorrelation
Sargan Test of
Overid. Restriction
AB test for AR(1)
in first differences
AB test for AR(2)
in first differences
Sargan Test of
Overid.
restrictions
st

Test
1st order
autocorrelation
2nd order
autocorrelation
Sargan Test of
Overid. Restriction
AB test for AR(1)
in first differences
AB test for AR(2)
in first differences
Sargan Test of
Overid.
restrictions

Hypothesis 2.1
Estimator
AB

BB

Test
1st order
autocorrelation
2nd order
autocorrelation
Sargan Test of
Overid. Restriction
AB test for AR(1)
in first differences
AB test for AR(2)
in first differences
Sargan Test of
Overid.
restrictions

H0
No
autocorrelation
No
autocorrelation

I
Z=‐4.58
Prob>z=0.000
Z=‐1.00
Prob>z=0.316
Prob>Chi2=0.005

II
Z=‐4.54
Pr>z=0.000
Z=‐0.90
Pr>z=0.3691
Prob>chi2=0.048

No
autocorrelation
No
autocorrelation

Z=‐4.56
Prob>z=0.000
Z=‐0.77
Prob>z=0.443
Chi2 (169)=735.65
Prob>chi2=0.004

Z=‐4.62
Prob>z=0.000
Z=‐0.88
Prob>z=0.380
Chi2(169)=639.18
Prob>chi2=0.006

H0
No
autocorrelation
No
autocorrelation

I
Z=‐8.33
Prob>z=0.000
Z=‐0.05
Prob>z=0.9573
Prob>Chi2=0.082

II
Z=‐8.27
Pr>z=0.000
Z=‐0.05
Pr>z=0.9588
Prob>chi2=0.085

No
autocorrelation
No
autocorrelation

Z=‐7.47
Prob>z=0.000
Z=0.01
Prob>z=0.990
Chi2 (169)=285.83
Prob>chi2=0.034

Z=‐7.49
Prob>z=0.000
Z=0.04
Prob>z=0.965
Chi2(169)=639.18
Prob>chi2=0.006

H0
No
autocorrelation
No
autocorrelation

I
Z=‐7.35
Prob>z=0.000
Z=‐0.62
Prob>z=0.5379
Prob>Chi2=0.001

II
Z=‐7.33
Pr>z=0.000
Z=‐0.60
Pr>z=0.5502
Prob>chi2=0.002

No
autocorrelation
No
autocorrelation

Z=‐7.73
Prob>z=0.000
Z=‐0.79
Prob>z=0.428
Chi2 (169)=438.85
Prob>chi2=0.000

Z=‐7.72
Prob>z=0.000
Z=‐0.58
Prob>z=0.562
Chi2(169)=639.18
Prob>chi2=0.004
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Hypothesis 3
Estimator
AB

BB

Hypothesis 6
Estimator
AB

BB

Test
1 order
autocorrelation
nd
2 order
autocorrelation
Sargan Test of
Overid. Restriction
AB test for AR(1)
in first differences
AB test for AR(2)
in first differences
Sargan Test of
Overid.
restrictions
st

Test
1 order
autocorrelation
2nd order
autocorrelation
Sargan Test of
Overid. Restriction
AB test for AR(1)
in first differences
AB test for AR(2)
in first differences
Sargan Test of
Overid.
restrictions
st

Hypothesis 6.1
Estimator
AB

BB

Test
1 order
autocorrelation
2nd order
autocorrelation
Sargan Test of
Overid. Restriction
AB test for AR(1)
in first differences
AB test for AR(2)
in first differences
Sargan Test of
Overid.
restrictions
st

H0
No
autocorrelation
No
autocorrelation

I
Z=‐9.42
Prob>z=0.000
Z=‐1.57
Prob>z=0.1153
Prob>Chi2=0.2677

II
Z=‐8.77
Pr>z=0.000
Z=‐1.69
Pr>z=0.0915
Prob>chi2=0.2366

No
autocorrelation
No
autocorrelation

Z=‐6.44
Prob>z=0.000
Z=‐0.69
Prob>z=0.491
Chi2 (169)=219.77
Prob>chi2=0.000

Z=‐6.60
Prob>z=0.000
Z=‐0.70
Prob>z=0.4855
Chi2(169)=223.63
Prob>chi2=0.004

H0
No
autocorrelation
No
autocorrelation

I
Z=‐5.81
Prob>z=0.000
Z=‐0.40
Prob>z=0.1153
Prob>Chi2=0.0004

II
Z=‐5.83
Pr>z=0.000
Z=0.70
Pr>z=0.4845
Prob>chi2=0.0457

No
autocorrelation
No
autocorrelation

Z=‐5.43
Prob>z=0.000
Z=‐0.04
Prob>z=0.969
Chi2 (169)=289.90
Prob>chi2=0.004

Z=‐5.76
Prob>z=0.000
Z=‐0.45
Prob>z=0.655
Chi2(169)=220.63
Prob>chi2=0.002

H0
No
autocorrelation
No
autocorrelation

I
Z=‐6.37
Prob>z=0.000
Z=‐0.86
Prob>z=0.3907
Prob>Chi2=0.876

II
Z=‐6.29
Pr>z=0.000
Z=‐0.69
Pr>z=0.492
Prob>chi2=0.821

No
autocorrelation
No
autocorrelation

Z=‐6.85
Prob>z=0.000
Z=‐0.94
Prob>z=0.346
Chi2 (169)=100.52
Prob>chi2=0.856

Z=‐6.73
Prob>z=0.000
Z=‐0.56
Prob>z=0.576
Chi2(169)=107.53
Prob>chi2=0.842
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Hypothesis 7
Estimator
AB

BB

Hypothesis 8
Estimator
AB

BB

Test
1 order
autocorrelation
nd
2 order
autocorrelation
Sargan Test of
Overid. Restriction
AB test for AR(1)
in first differences
AB test for AR(2)
in first differences
Sargan Test of
Overid.
restrictions
st

Test
1 order
autocorrelation
2nd order
autocorrelation
Sargan Test of
Overid. Restriction
AB test for AR(1)
in first differences
AB test for AR(2)
in first differences
Sargan Test of
Overid.
restrictions
st

H0
No
autocorrelation
No
autocorrelation

I
Z=‐9.01
Prob>z=0.000
Z=3.15
Prob>z=0.095
Prob>Chi2=0.184

II
Z=‐8.99
Pr>z=0.000
Z=3.04
Pr>z=0.156
Prob>chi2=0.130

No
autocorrelation
No
autocorrelation

Z=‐10.15
Prob>z=0.000
Z=‐0.55
Prob>z=0.584
Chi2 (169)=163.04
Prob>chi2=0.062

Z=‐9.96
Prob>z=0.000
Z=0.70
Prob>z=0.485
Chi2(169)=220.63
Prob>chi2=0.059

H0
No
autocorrelation
No
autocorrelation

I
Z=‐9.94
Prob>z=0.000
Z=0.13
Prob>z=0.098
Prob>Chi2=0.053

II
Z=‐8.99
Pr>z=0.000
Z=1.91
Pr>z=0.087
Prob>chi2=0.0457

No
autocorrelation
No
autocorrelation

Z=‐10.37
Prob>z=0.000
Z=‐0.75
Prob>z=0.610
Chi2 (169)=220.63
Prob>chi2=0.004

Z=‐10.54
Prob>z=0.000
Z=0.70
Prob>z=0.485
Chi2(169)=131.20
Prob>chi2=0.032
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